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Introduction
It has been nearly a decade since the ‘capability-
expectations gap’ was noted in the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).1 The development
of the EU Common European Security and Defence
Policy (CESDP) from 1998 onwards has seen the
emergence of a parallel rhetoric-resources gap in crisis
management. The latter has gained fresh saliency
following the EU’s announcement of its intention to
take-over the UN’s police operation in Bosnia
Herzegovina, with the formation of an EU Police Mission
(EUPM) in January 2003. The EU’s willingness to
assume the current duties of NATO’s Amber Fox mission
in FYROM, when its mandate expires, has also moved
this issue to centre stage.
The rhetoric-resources gap has two dimensions to it.
The first relate to civilian crisis management, which
includes conflict prevention. These activities generally
fall to the Commission and consist of a wide range of
programmes spread over a number of directorates-general.
The military aspects of crisis management, which have
elicited more public attention and comment, were
developed as part of the Petersberg Tasks, first outlined
by the Western European Union in 1992 and adopted by
the EU in the Amsterdam modifications to the Treaty on
European Union.2 These aspects form part of the CESDP
which, in turn, is part of the CFSP. The civilian and
military components of crisis management are supposed
to allow the EU to respond at an appropriate level to a
variety of crisis scenarios. Since the budgetary and
resource issues differ slightly between the aspects of
crisis management, they will be addressed separately.
Civilian Crisis Management
Currently EU crisis management, which incorporates a
wide range of conflict prevention, civilian and military
crisis management tools, may be financed by three
possible sources:3
a) Operations falling under the EU budget line;4
b) Operations not having military or defence
implications, falling under the CFSP allocation line;
c) CESDP operations having military or defence
implications, which fall outside the EU budget.
The first two cover a wide range of activities and there
is frequent confusion to outside observers about what
type of activity falls under a general Community heading
or the more specific CFSP heading.5 Those items falling
under the first category tend to be short-term or event
specific, while those falling under the CFSP line often
address longer-term issues. There are though significant
areas of grey stemming, in part, from the treaties. For
instance, responsibility for human rights and democracy
is attributed both to CFSP (Article 11 of the Treaty on
European Union or TEU) as well as to the first pillar in
the context of development cooperation (Article 177 of
the EC Treaty).6Those operations that are deemed to fall
under the second category come are generally charged
to the EU budget and, thus, EU budgetary law applies.
There is however provision (under Article 28 of the
TEU) for the Council to unanimously decide that
expenditure shall not be charged to the EU budget, in
which case it is charged to the Member States.
The final category, relating to CESDP, will be
discussed in a separate section below. The modest size
of the CFSP budget, compared to that of external relations
generally, makes the question of which pot resources are
drawn from a delicate one.
The first issue often noted with reference to civilian
crisis management operations is that of the organisational
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and efficiency-related problems. These are however
well covered elsewhere and will not therefore be
reviewed.7 Suffice it to say that the Commission has
acknowledged many of the shortcomings and taken
remedial steps. For instance, the Commission has
suggested recourse to a new ‘flexibility instrument’ for
civil crisis interventions, including CFSP action, as well
as to the current emergence reserve within the budget.8
It was however acknowledged that financing
mechanisms within the budget ‘need to be reviewed and
improved’ (both for CFSP financing procedures and
Community instruments).9 A balance also has to be
struck between efficiency, reliability and speed of
response. The lack of rapid mechanisms for the
implementation of CFSP operations and the ponderous
decision-making process remains a challenge.10
The problem though is not only one of how to
administer funds and resources. It is evident that, under
the current financial perspective (2000-2006), available
resources ‘do not match the very ambitious targets
developed in 1999 and would certainly not be sufficient
to cover crisis actions such as the substitution of local
police forces in non-member countries’.11 One possible
response to this may be, as suggested by the Commission,
to extend an emergency reserve to CFSP
crisis interventions,





recent, tool is the Rapid
Reaction Mechanism
(RRM) which operates
through a separate budget line in the regular budget. The
RRM provides for both speed and flexibility to mobilise
any Community instrument (other than humanitarian
instruments already covered by emergency procedures)
for crisis contingencies.13
Other suggested solutions include the establishment
by the Member States of a common civilian/military
fund to be financed annually and managed by the
Council Secretariat, with the idea of eventually including
it in the EU budget at a later date.14 It should though be
borne in mind that, in order to contain the growth of the
resources taken up by the Community, Community
expenditure is limited to a combined total of 1.27% of
GNP of the EU Member States until 2006. The
Commission nevertheless estimates that the current
financial perspective offers scope for ‘gradually building
up over the entire period a margin that leaves some room
for unforeseeable events in the area of external relations,
reinforcement of programmes where necessary, and
possible deflator fluctuations’.15
While the idea of a fund that could address both
civilian and military costs has some attraction, especially
given the resistance amongst the Member States towards
any enhanced oversight by the European Parliament, it
would raise a number of problems. The creation of a
parallel funding structure (to that of the Community) is
unlikely to enhance efficiency and would scarcely
encourage transparency, as urged by the Court of
Auditors. A parallel funding structure might also invite
the circumvention of the Union’s budgetary procedures
and actually decrease the effectiveness of the existing
mechanisms discussed above. To the Commission a
parallel budget risks, ‘duplication; reduced management
efficiency; lack of budgetary transparency; and
incoherence in overall financial management in the
EU’.16
The Commission’s preference is to enhance the
flexibility of the Community procedures and to create
a new instrument for civil crisis interventions, which
includes CFSP action, by extending the use of the
emergency reserve to CFSP crisis interventions. The
emergency reserve would have to be established by
means of an Inter Institutional Agreement and it would
fall outside the regular budget for such activities (Heading
4) and thus maintain the overall financial perspective.
The flexibility instrument would have the advantage of
greater transparency compared to the ad hoc funding
mechanism above. However, the precise procedures
pertaining to such an instrument have yet to be agreed
upon. Any agreement will have to address the inherent
tension between transparency and accountability on
the one hand, and the
need for rapid decision-




sight in the external
relations area, which
would presumably in-
volve a greater role for the European Parliament, would
be firmly resisted by a number of member states. This
may have the effect of pushing ad hoc, and possibly
inadequate, funding solutions to the fore.
Operations having military or defence implications
Under the TEU, the EU budget is the primary means of
financing CFSP. There was however provision for the
Council to unanimously agree that operational
expenditure could be charged to the Member States on
a GNP-scale. The ambiguity about what should be
considered administrative or operational expenditure
led to a number of disagreements, including one that
delayed the implementation of the EU Joint Action in
Mostar. The situation is further complicated by
Denmark’s opt out on all defence and security related
provisions on the treaty.
Under an Inter-Institutional Agreement (between
the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission) it was agreed that the CFSP budget could
be used to finance activities such as the special envoys,
democratic transition, conflict prevention and
disarmament.17 Of more significance was the Amsterdam
Treaty’s stipulation in Article 28 that ‘administrative
expenditure’ shall be charged to the budget of the
Community, while ‘operations having military or
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defence implications’ shall be charged to the Member
States in accordance with a GNP-scale, unless the Council
unanimously decided otherwise.
It was against this background that CESDP developed
in the late 1990s. Two issues became apparent with
regard to financing. First, the issue of how military
operations should be financed amongst the Member
States came to the fore, as did the issue of what constitutes
a ‘military or defence implication’. It was though clear
that the final phrase clearly excludes police aspects of
an operation, even if they include military assistance.
The second, more general issue, concerned who should
finance the improvements required to make CESDP
operational by 2003.18
On the first issue the Belgian Presidency, who was
charged by the previous Presidency to work out the
financing arrangements for crisis management
operations, suggested three funding options along with
the Council Secretariat.19 In spite of their efforts, the
Belgian Presidency was unable to secure agreement
between the options. The root cause of disagreement
was over what consti-
tutes a common cost.
Towards the end of the
Spanish Presidency,







mon costs are con-
sidered to be:20
• Costs that cannot
be allotted to in-
dividual States
taking part in a
crisis management mission. This covers a number of
incremental costs for headquarters for EU-led
operations (such as transport costs, administration,
locally hired personnel, communications, trans-
portation/travel within the operations area of HQs
and barracks and lodging/infrastructure) and for
providing support to the forces as a whole (such as
infrastructure and additional equipment).
It is up to the Council to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether transportation of the forces, barracks and
lodging for the forces should be funded in common. All
other costs are therefore considered to be individual
costs and will be financed on a ‘costs lie where they fall’
basis (as in NATO). It should also be noted that the
common financing of incremental costs ‘does not entail
financing of military assets and capabilities offered by
participant States on a voluntary basis and compiled in
the Helsinki Force Catalogue’.21 Nor will expenditures
that would be encountered regardless of any operation
(such as staff costs, equipment of accommodation) be
covered. Common expenditure on goods and services
only addresses requirements ‘over and above those
which could reasonably be expected to be covered from
national resources’.22
The Council’s suggested interim funding is primarily
aimed at the incremental costs that may be entailed for
the provision of fixed or mobile headquarters for EU-led
operations and any incremental costs to meet the general
support of the forces involved (such as infrastructure,
additional equipment or medical support). The Council
decision of 17 June 2002 is undoubtedly welcome
progress, but it is subject to review and further work. A
number of issues demand further attention and these will
be examined below.
Horse-trading
The question of what constitutes an operation having
‘military or defence implications’ remains. The growth
of EU crisis management to include a myriad of different
roles, carries with it the potential for further horse
trading between the general EU budget for external
relations, the CFSP heading and those of the Member
States. Indeed, there
may be strong incen-
tives to play on the
grey areas of crisis
management for finan-
cial reasons. This temp-
tation may become
even stronger since the
CFSP allocation for




year, the figure is € 30
million.23  The CFSP
allocation continues
to be deluged by fresh
demands on its resources, such as those for a possible EU
successor to the UN IPTF.24 In the EU budget the annual
appropriations commitment for external policies
accounts for around 8.4% of the total budget was increased
from € 1.9 billion in 1990 to € 8.6 billion for 2001, at
constant 2000 prices. Since the vast majority of external
action funding goes to the Western Balkans and the
Mediterranean, which arguably has significant benefits
for stability, there is little likelihood of any substantial
reallocation within the budget.
The inevitable tendency will therefore be to continue
to try and pass on costs between the general external
relations budget and CFSP, as well as between these
budgets and the Member States. The assumption of costs
may also meet with demands for quid pro quos. For
instance, the ‘costs lie where they fall’ formula could
lead to the situation whereby, since it is normally the
same countries that contribute, demands are made for
‘special status’ similar to that of the permanent members
of the UN Security Council.25
The temptation to juggle between budgets has
obvious political aspects. If the assumption is made that
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more EU funding for CFSP were allocated or made
available, the Member States would have to accept
greater Community oversight. The predominantly
intergovernmental character of the second pillar suggests
that this is unlikely to change significantly. The
administrative expenses of CFSP are relatively light,
given the relatively small number of personnel involved,
but the operational expenses for sustained Petersberg
tasks that will have to be assumed predominantly by the
Member States, are likely to be significant.
National capabilities and resources
The actual ability to conduct a crisis management
operation involving military force is, for the most part,
the responsibility of the EU Member States. The general
contributions of the EU Member States to such operations
were outlined at the Capabilities Commitment
Conference in November 2001. The conference
generated offers of over 100,000 troops and a wide range
of capabilities.26 The Capabilities Improvement
Conference, held a year later, revised the national
contributions and acknowledged that several short-
comings had been rectified in whole or in part.
Nevertheless, it was also noted that ‘additional efforts
must be made with regard to protecting forces deployed,
commitment capability and logistics. The degree of
availability of ground
elements, operational
mobility and the flexi-
bility of the force de-
ployed must also be
improved’.27 Possible
strategic deficiencies also emerged in aspects of
command, control, communication and intelligence
(C3I) as well as ISTAR (satellite imaging) and wide-
bodied aircraft. In spite of improvements, where the EU
Member States claimed to have fulfilled 144 capability
requirements identified, 20 were considered unresolved
and serious.28 Accordingly, the Capabilities Improve-
ment Conference adopted a European Capability Action
Plan (ECAP) to improve European crisis-management
capabilities. The plan is voluntary and is based on a
‘bottom-up’ approach and is supposed to be implemented
through:
• An increase in the resources made available to the
EU;
• Make existing capacities more effective and to seek
creative responses beyond the traditional framework
of military procurement programmes;
• Multinational solutions which might include co-
production, financing and acquisition of capabilities,
particularly for large-scale projects as well as specific
capabilities.
ECAP too may suffer from its own rhetoric-resources
gap since defence budgets for the European NATO
countries have continued to decline in real terms or
remained static since 1997.29 The United Kingdom is
the one country that is resisting the downward trend with
projected increases in defence expenditure projected
for 2003-4, joined recently by France with ambitious
plans for a six-year plan to boost military spending. The
efforts to boost French defence expenditure are designed
to make France a ‘credible partner for the British’ and to
provide the ‘means for autonomy of decision and of
action’.30 Those countries that at least tried to stabilise
defence expenditure did so in the face of the weak euro
and its decline against the dollar. With the prospect of
a stronger Euro and modest economic growth of between
1.5% and 2.0% of GNP over the next year or so (in
accordance with OECD projections) an increase in
military investment (that is, procurement, research and
development, testing and evaluation) cannot be entirely
dismissed. Contrary to elite nervousness (or just plain
reticence), an increase in military expenditure should
not be a hard sell politically either since threats to peace
and security have been the main public preoccupation
throughout the EU in recent years (ahead of even
unemployment).31
It is though worth noting that past optimistic
assessments of the European NATO members’
performances, which projected an increase in defence
expenditure in the framework of the Defence Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) on the part of most of these countries,
proved to be unfounded.32 Even if we assume the
maintenance of defence expenditure levels in real terms,
it may ‘not provide
sufficient funding to
achieve the augmenta-
tion and upgrading of
European capabilities
in the critical areas of
force projection, PGMs, and C4I’.33
The question of matching rhetoric with resources is
greatly complicated by the absence of any public EU
estimates of the costs of CESDP and, more generally,
those of the EU’s overall crisis management capacity.
There are though some useful non-official estimates of
potential costs for the EU Member States.34 These
estimates show divergences of opinion between those
who believe that real levels of military spending can and
will increase (such as RAND) and those who see the
extensive reallocation of existing defence expenditure
as the primary means of addressing shortcomings. The
general European preference seems to rest upon the
reallocation of resources within existing patterns of
military expenditure. This though is open to the obvious
objection, noted in a RAND study, that significant
reallocation is unlikely due to ‘organizational inertia,
powerful service interests, and the familiar “iron triangle”
… between the defence industry, the military services,
and national legislatures’.35
Enlargement
Relatively little attention has been given to the financial
impact of EU enlargement on CFSP and, more
particularly, CESDP. In political terms it is clear, based
on past and current contributions to multinational
peacekeeping operations, that the accession countries
are net security providers and not consumers. In military
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terms the presence of three NATO members amongst the
EU candidates and widespread military restructuring
and reform, will make the new members valuable
partners.
Economically however, all are struggling with the
pressures involved in preparing for EU membership and
it is unlikely that this will lead to any appreciable
increase in defence expenditure. In terms of helping the
EU address its known weaknesses in the CESDP area,
there is little prospect of any significant change. Indeed,
given the scepticism towards CESDP on the part of a
good number of candidates, the political and economic
preference may well be to enhance the effectiveness of
NATO in response to President Bush’s call for an ‘out of
area’ NATO rapid reaction force.36 It remains though to
be seen whether an appeal for an increase in defence
funding for NATO contingencies would be any more
effective than appeals to enhance CFSP/CESDP.
Awaiting Berlin Plus
A further source of ambiguity is what assumptions
should be made about the ability of the EU to gain access
to particular NATO assets for ‘Europe-only’ operations
(the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements), which may
obviate the need for the EU Member States to acquire an
independent capability. Unfortunately, there is little
sign of a resolution to the Greek objections to the Ankara
document which would have made a Turkish veto of EU
access to NATO assets
(since approval has
to be unanimous
amongst all 19 NATO
members) less likely.
Although this is a
significant impedi-
ment, it is exaggerated
in the sense that the
real issue is whether
the U.S. will permit
access to assets that are in fact national and not those of
NATO per se. In a number of instances, notably strategic
intelligence, the assets that are likely to be required for
Europe-only operations are exclusively American. Quite
aside from the willingness of the U.S. to ‘loan’ potentially
sensitive assets to its European allies, there is no
guarantee that they will be available for the duration of
the operation, nor are there any cost sharing arrangements
for such an eventuality. Because of these vagaries, the
emphasis that was placed on avoiding unnecessary
duplication of NATO assets during the Clinton
administrations is now changing to a debate about
necessary duplication.
Third Parties
The EU is in the process of developing crisis management
cooperation programmes with a number of significant
third parties which, so far, extend to Canada, Russia and
the Ukraine. The cost implications of this are ambiguous
although it is assumed that, as with the EU Member
States, the majority of the expenses would have to be
assumed by the countries themselves. In a crisis scenario
the contribution of significant military forces within the
framework of an EU-led operation, would entitle the
contributors to participate in the Committee of
Contributors which plays a key role in the day-to-day
management of operations. In each case the non-EU
contributors will enjoy ‘the same rights and obligations
in terms of day-to-day management of the operation’ as
the EU participants.37 It remains to be seen what the
financial implications of these arrangements may be.
Post-crisis procedures
A further area of ambiguity is the post-operation
settlement of costs and the funding of any subsequent
peacekeeping operations – an issue very much to the
fore with concerns that it will again be the European
allies who will primarily be expected to pick up the
pieces following any military strike against Iraq. In
those circumstances where the EU is engaged in
Petersberg tasks, the possibility of developing common
EU assets to be put at the disposal of coalitions of the
willing might usefully be explored. This would however
give rise to the question of repatriation of common
equipment. Some of the expenditure, such as
administration, translation or transport, would clearly
not be applicable but capital expenditure on
communications or essential additional equipment
might. In this event, should the equipment be pooled
into a EU-infrastruc-
ture pool (along NATO
lines) or put under the
care of a Member State
or group thereof? A
resolution of this issue
may also determine




assets, possibly under the control of the EU Military
Committee, rather than relying upon shorter-term leasing
arrangements.
Conclusions
The above examination of funding for EU crisis
management addresses three themes. The first examined
civilian crisis management. The problem identified was
partially one of resources and in this regard the use of
parallel ad hoc funding mechanisms based on national
contributions has some attraction, although an extension
to the emergency reserve system is preferred. The main
challenge for the EU will be to increase flexibility and
the ability to respond in a timely manner to crises, whilst
also meeting the demands of accountability and
transparency. Any interinstitutional agreement on the
procedures will have to consider the idea of fewer actors
being involved in decision making in emergency crisis
scenarios, even if this means less immediate transparency.
The second issue is the gap between rhetoric and
resources for those aspects of crisis management having
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military implications. It is obviously too late to meet the
2003 Headline Goal target. It has already been established
that a number of projects that are critical to CESDP, such
as the A400 M heavy transport aircraft, will not be
completed until the end of this decade.38 The question
of how to respond to the gap is also exacerbated by a
number of vagaries, such as the future of EU and NATO
relations, as well as transatlantic relations. It has been
argued that there is an urgent need to address the
resources issue assuming that there will be necessary
duplication of NATO assets to afford the EU the necessary
autonomy. The inescapable conclusion is that existing
expenditure patterns means that the EU Rapid Reaction
Force has no chance of being fully operational by
2003.39
The third set of issues involves the political and
economic implications for EU crisis management of
relations with third parties, organisations such as NATO
and enlargement. All will continue to pose vexatious
problems but the most immediate is that of EU-NATO
relations. The failure to reach agreement on the ‘Berlin
Plus’ arrangements between the two organisations has
not only soured relations between the two organisations
but also risks paralysing CESDP. Even if the objections
to the Ankara document were lifted, the real problem of
when and how to borrow primarily American assets
would come to the fore. The debate over how much
duplication of (so called) NATO assets is necessary is
long overdue and will have potentially sizeable
budgetary implications for the European allies.
Increased efficiency and flexibility can primarily
address the civilian aspects of EU crisis management.
However, whatever progress that is made in this area
risks being undermined by the stultification of the
military aspects of EU crisis management. It is plain that
fulfilling capability shortfalls for military crisis
management gives most EU governments little
alternative other than ‘to increase defence expenditure
in real terms if real capabilities are to match the objectives
set out at Helsinki’.40 This is certainly not a new or
particularly original point, but it remains a point that is
of fundamental importance to the EU. So far, the gap
between rhetoric and resources has not faced the EU with
overt catastrophe but one is entirely predictable, given
the EU’s crisis management rhetoric and the resources
available. Mind the gap.
________________
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